DURBAN, KwaZulu-Natal — South Africa’s election violence crisis is on a trajectory to deteriorate sharply, a leading researcher has warned, as the November 4 municipal polls approach and political factions in KwaZulu-Natal intensify their deadly contests for control of local government coffers. Professor Richard Pithouse, a research fellow at the Global Centre for Advanced Studies, says political assassinations in the country have doubled over the past ten years and that the situation is set to worsen as the MK Party consolidates power in the province.
Arresting Hitmen While Masterminds Walk Free
The Political Killings Task Team (PKTT), established in 2018, has arrested more than 400 suspects, including 180 alleged hitmen. Yet, according to Pithouse, these figures mask a fundamental failure in strategy. He describes the arrested contract killers as “alienated, damaged young men” who are easily replaced, arguing that law enforcement must target the individuals who commission and finance the murders.
“If you arrest one hitman, we really need to arrest the people who are ordering these hits,” Pithouse stated. He cited the assassination of whistleblower Babita Deokaran, noting that while arrests were made, the individuals who made the decision and paid the killers remain untouched by the criminal justice system.
A Councillor’s Death and the Election Calendar
The urgency of the crisis was underscored this week with the assassination of Musqua, one of the longest-serving ANC councillors in the eThekwini municipality. The killing occurred immediately after the second voter registration weekend, raising questions about whether a documented pattern of violence clustering around registration periods and candidate list compilations is intensifying.
Pithouse confirmed that while there is a “constant thrum” of political killings throughout the year, empirical evidence shows a clear escalation during election cycles. The violence is no longer confined to a single party. Although the phenomenon originated primarily in KwaZulu-Natal among the ANC, IFP, and NFP in earlier decades—and more recently saw the assassination of an EFF councillor in Pretoria—Pithouse stressed that the problem has evolved into an overwhelmingly intra-party affair within the ANC.
He invoked a stark metaphor to describe the provincial containment failure: “Unlike Vegas, what happens in Durban doesn’t stay in Durban.” The violence, he said, is migrating into the rest of the country and is no longer merely a KwaZulu-Natal problem.
The Financial Engine: Why Local Elections Are Deadlier
Statistics compiled since 2000 reveal that municipal elections have generated 105 recorded political assassination cases, compared to 81 linked to national polls. Pithouse explains the disparity in blunt economic terms. A Member of Parliament in Cape Town passes legislation and sits on committees but does not control spending. A local councillor in a municipality like Durban, however, exercises direct influence over enormous budgets and tender allocations.
“That is why there is so much violence around these elections,” Pithouse said. “Nothing to do with ideology. It’s access to money and power.”
This financial incentive is underpinned by a pre-existing criminal infrastructure in the province. Pithouse pointed to the taxi industry, the firearms economy, and an established hitman profession—complete with recruitment networks—as enabling factors. He added that KwaZulu-Natal carries a long history of political violence and a deep “militarization of the political imagination,” creating interlocking conditions that make the province the primary source and epicentre of the crisis.
The MK Party Factor and a Darker Forecast
Opinion polls project that the ANC will be “completely devastated” in KwaZulu-Natal on November 4, with the MK Party (MKP) poised to become the most powerful political force in the province. Pithouse warns that this shift is unlikely to reduce bloodshed. Many of the individuals migrating from the ANC into the MKP, he noted, are the very figures most associated with the existing culture of political violence.
He characterised the MKP as “not even really in principle invested in democracy in the way that the ANC was,” describing its political posture as significantly more militarized. His forecast was unequivocal: “It’s definitely going to get worse.”
Pithouse cautioned that the escalation will not be limited to assassinations of politicians or candidates. The province and the wider country already have a grim record of murdered grassroots activists, auditors, and lawyers. He raised the alarming possibility that journalists could become future targets. In recent months, the epicentre of violence has expanded into xenophobic mobilisation, with armed groups openly assaulting citizens, expropriating businesses and possessions, and driving people from their homes—sometimes while police watch or even participate.
“We have to ask who will be the next victims,” Pithouse said, warning that once the capacity for violence is mobilised, it rarely remains confined to a single target set. Political rivals, party colleagues, and community members who stand against corruption all become potential victims.
A Nation Resembling Central America
Drawing an international parallel, Pithouse stated that South Africa has reached a point where political violence is “baked into the system,” likening the situation to countries in Central America or Mexico. He insisted that the nation can no longer pretend the crisis is trivial or that things are mostly fine.
His proposed remedies are multi-layered. On the policing front, he acknowledged that officers are frequently implicated in the same power networks profiting from tenders and ordering assassinations. The solution, he argues, lies in independent, ring-fenced, specialised police teams insulated from local political and economic power holders. He referenced South Africa’s own experience in the early 1990s during the ANC-IFP violence, as well as international precedents, as evidence that such units can work when properly resourced and given strong political backing.
Beyond policing, Pithouse called for a professional civil service, rigorous oversight of public spending, and faster, more effective mechanisms to address corruption. He also demanded a fundamental cultural reckoning, questioning whether—30 years after the necessary armed struggle against apartheid—South Africa still needs to present politics in “masculinist militarized terms.” He noted that political violence is never directed at those with real power or at systems that reproduce injustice; it is always visited upon the vulnerable.
Unresolved Cases and the Road Ahead
While Pithouse welcomed the PKTT’s arrests, he highlighted serious investigative gaps. He recounted the case of a young activist named Nagushuni, who was assassinated. Despite actual video footage of the killers being available and repeatedly brought to police attention, officers never arrived to collect the evidence. “It’s not like this is an uncomplicated success,” Pithouse said.
He emphasised that only by identifying, investigating, arresting, prosecuting, and convicting the people who give the orders will the cycle be broken.
With 87 days remaining until the local government elections, the question now is whether increased resources directed at the PKTT can disrupt the underlying economy of murder before the death toll climbs further. For the residents of KwaZulu-Natal—and increasingly the rest of South Africa—the countdown to November 4 carries a weight far heavier than a ballot.
