JOHANNESBURG, Gauteng — As the African National Congress (ANC) faces fresh legal battles over excluded candidates ahead of the November local government elections, the party’s internal dispute resolution mechanisms are under intense scrutiny. Leading this charge is Andile Lungisa, who has already filed court papers challenging his removal as the ANC’s mayoral candidate for Nelson Mandela Bay, highlighting a growing reliance on the judicial system to settle internal factional disputes.
According to Emeritus Professor at Wits University, Professor Susan Booysen, the trend of members reverting to the courts when internal party matters go awry has become a defining phenomenon within the ANC. Despite the availability of internal conflict resolution institutions, these mechanisms are frequently perceived as slow, lacking credibility, and heavily controlled by specific factions.
Professor Booysen noted that 2012 served as a critical turning point for this dynamic. During that period, Ramakatsa and six others objected to the Free State elective processes that led to the election of Ace Magashule as premier. This objection subsequently impacted the delegates to the 2012 Mangaung conference. The drama culminated mid-conference when a judge ruled in favor of the objections, upholding that the Free State votes were invalid and separating them from the conference count. This precedent was solidified when the Constitutional Court ruled that political parties have a strict obligation to follow their own internal processes and guarantee their members’ right to fair political participation.
Since 2014, nearly every election cycle has been marred by major crises within the ANC regarding candidate nominations. Historically, very few of these disputes actually reach a final court judgment. Instead, they are often settled politically, with unsuccessful candidates appeased through patronage or alternative positions, leading them to withdraw their grievances.
However, the political landscape has shifted. The ANC now controls fewer councils and provinces, operating increasingly within coalition governments. With less political capital to distribute as patronage, there is a much stronger motivation for unsuccessful candidates to seek justice through the courts rather than accepting internal party settlements.
If the courts do rule in favor of Andile Lungisa, it would force the ANC to adopt a mayoral candidate it explicitly rejected, allegedly due to illegitimate removal by the party’s Secretary General, Fikile Mbalula. Professor Booysen warned that such an outcome would severely dent the ANC’s credibility with voters and expose the party to a wave of similar legal contestations.
This vulnerability is compounded by the reality that the ANC is working with a shrinking political base. While major factions like the EFF and Jacob Zuma’s supporters have largely moved to other parties (though Zuma continues to contest his standing within the ANC), the remaining shrinking base is increasingly exposed to internal legal warfare. This environment does not bode well for the party’s ability to rebuild into a cohesive organization capable of navigating modern interparty political battles.
There are also grave concerns that these factional and legal battles could spill over to the residents of Nelson Mandela Bay. If a court-mandated candidate is forced upon the local branch, the risk of internal sabotage remains high. Given that the municipality is already precarious, undermining the foundational legitimacy of its leadership could severely disrupt governance, stability, and municipal service delivery for citizens.
At the center of this administrative storm is ANC Secretary General Fikile Mbalula, who is facing intense pressure over the candidate list failures alongside a separate defamation lawsuit. Professor Booysen assessed that Baloyi is in a highly vulnerable position ahead of the crucial 2027 national conference. Tasked with holding together an organization drifting in multiple directions, his defensive responses have arguably deepened the challenges surrounding the nomination crisis. While only six out of 257 municipalities are directly affected by this specific candidate crisis, the embarrassment projects an image of a party incapable of managing its own internal affairs—an impression the ANC can poorly afford as it seeks to retain voter trust.
These relentless legal battles signal more than just factional maneuvering; they reflect a broader shift in South African governance. Voters are already deeply cynical about political parties, and these public fallouts are unlikely to restore confidence. Consequently, the ANC is projected to decline further in the upcoming local government elections.
Simultaneously, the courts are assuming an increasingly dominant role in keeping the government on a lawful path. Beyond internal party crises, the judiciary is actively engaged in overseeing processes like the Madlanga Commission, addressing national security and law enforcement failures, and recently overruling legislation due to improper governmental processes.
When asked if these factional legal battles represent the “last kicks of a dying horse,” Professor Booysen described the analogy as contentious but acknowledged the party is no longer a growing, vibrant force. It has suffered strategic, systematic, and incremental setbacks election after election. Yet, due to the sheer size of its historical base, even an accelerated decline will likely leave the ANC as the biggest party in the country for the foreseeable future. This creates an invigorating but challenging political reality: a predominant party that is steadily declining, yet remains the primary governing force, a dynamic South Africa will continue to navigate in the years to come.
