PRETORIA – The proposed DA cabinet reshuffle and the controversial demotion of John Steenhuisen have placed President Cyril Ramaphosa in a critical position. As the Democratic Alliance restructures its roles, the move tests the stability of the multi-party coalition government ahead of the local elections.
Democratic Alliance leader Geordin Hill-Lewis has formally written to the presidency outlining several changes to the party’s representatives in the national government. The requested adjustments include replacing Steenhuisen as the Minister of Agriculture with Willie Aucamp. Steenhuisen, who previously led the DA, would subsequently be demoted to the role of Deputy Minister of Trade, Industry, and Competition (DTIC). Furthermore, the proposal suggests moving David Maynier from the Western Cape provincial government to serve as the new Minister of Forestry, Fisheries, and the Environment, while Yusuf Kasim would transition into the Deputy Minister of Education role.
Presidency spokesperson Vincent Magwenya confirmed the receipt of the correspondence, noting that President Ramaphosa will apply his mind to the requests and issue an announcement in due course.
Political analyst Professor Bheki Mngomezulu from Nelson Mandela University observes that while new leadership often brings a “new broom sweeps clean” approach, the proposed maneuvers present notable contradictions. He points out that the DA has historically criticized the African National Congress (ANC) for recycling its political figures, yet these latest proposals appear to mirror that exact behavior.
Mngomezulu questions the logic of demoting Steenhuisen to a deputy role in a different department rather than removing him entirely if his tenure has run its course. He notes that Kasim’s move to the education portfolio makes logical sense as it remains within his familiar domain, but the other adjustments seem to be mere political recycling.
Several underlying factors likely drive Steenhuisen’s proposed demotion, including internal party divisions and the handling of the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. While some objective observers credit Steenhuisen for being highly visible in sourcing medication from South America—a move his predecessors failed to make—frustrated farmers have launched litigation over the issue. This dissatisfaction has prompted the DA to act swiftly ahead of the November 4 local government elections. Additionally, Mngomezulu highlights that during the 2024 post-election coalition negotiations, Helen Zille appeared to be the public face of the party, even though Steenhuisen was the one who actually conducted the bulk of the negotiations that secured the DA’s place in the multi-party government.
The proposed placement of Steenhuisen in the DTIC is particularly fraught. Mngomezulu emphasizes that the DTIC is a highly sensitive portfolio where economic policy and race intersect, particularly regarding Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and affirmative action. The DA has historically opposed policies like BEE and triple-B, advocating for strict timeframes to conclude such processes. As far back as 2018, the party publicly stated that neither race nor gender should factor into leadership elections, focusing exclusively on skills and experience.
Mngomezulu argues that ignoring race in South African politics is akin to daydreaming, given the country’s history. He points to the historical struggles of the DA’s so-called black caucus, citing the departures of figures like Mmusi Maimane and Herman Mashaba. Placing a staunch critic of transformation policies in the DTIC role essentially sets Steenhuisen up for failure, forcing him to contest his own bosses in the ANC-led coalition—a coalition the DA joined on the ANC’s invitation, with the ANC remaining the largest party with 40.18% of the vote. Notably, the only previous instance where Ramaphosa removed a member of another party from the coalition was Andrew Whitfield, who previously held the very same DTIC position.
Constitutionally, the final decision rests entirely with the President. Sections 84E, 91, and 93 of the Constitution explicitly empower the President to appoint and dismiss ministers and deputy ministers. Mngomezulu recalled his past assertions regarding former President Jacob Zuma’s ministerial firings, maintaining that the courts misled the nation by demanding the President explain his decisions. He noted that Ramaphosa successfully challenged that ruling, affirming that the President holds the prerogative to hire and fire without needing to justify the moves to anyone, provided the decisions are rational and constitutionally sound.
However, the President’s response will set a significant precedent. With ten distinct parties forming the multi-party coalition, any accommodation or rejection of the DA’s demands will dictate how similar requests from other parties are handled in the future. If the President rejects the changes, it could fracture the coalition; if he accepts, he must apply the exact same standard to all ten parties when they present similar demands.
Ultimately, Mngomezulu argues that these drastic changes risk dividing the party on the eve of an election. He asserts that the DA has long lost its “good governance” tag after choosing to work with the ANC, a party it previously labeled as corrupt.
“Both the ANC and the DA have an identity crisis,” Mngomezulu stated, noting that the ANC operates on the false premise that it is still the sole governing party, while the DA operates on the wrong assumption that it is still the official opposition. He concluded that the two parties are essentially birds of the same feather flying together, and by recycling ministers, the DA is doing exactly what it once accused the ANC of doing.